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Much evidence suggests that initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stocks are 
systematically priced at a discount to their subsequent initial trading price. The large 
underpricing magnitude in the Chinese IPO market has attracted much attention. Mok 
and Hui (1998) report an underpricing of 289% for a sample of 87 Shanghai IPOs 
listed from 1990 to 1993. Su and Fleisher (1999) find the underpricing level as high as 
948.6% for Chinese A-share IPOs before January 1, 1996. A more updated report is 
from Tian (2003), who found an average of 267% of initial returns for IPOs from 
1991 through 2000. These reported underpricing levels in the Chinese market are 
much higher than the average level of 60% in the emerging markets (Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist, 2001). Despite many studies on the Chinese IPO underpricing, few studies 
have been done to investigate the reasons in light of classical IPO underpricing 
theories. Although previous studies such as Mok and Hui (1998), Su and Fleisher 
(1999), and Chau et al (1999) have explored some reasons for the high IPO 
underpricing, most of the studies examine a few aspects that may affect IPO 
underpricing. For many markets, whether developed or emerging, IPO underpricing 
may be explained in terms of some classical IPO underpricing models such as 
asymmetric information models, institutional explanations and ownership and control 
(see Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). Tests of the Chinese IPO underpricing against 
classical IPO underpricing models are, however, far from comprehensive. This paper 
attempts to shed light on this issue by examining some classical models of IPO 





The classical IPO underpricing models examined in this study are the winner’s curse 
model (Rock, 1986), ex ante uncertainty hypothesis (Ritter, 1984; Beatty and Ritter, 
1986) and the signaling model (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 
1989; Welch, 1989, 1996). Among those tested classical models, the winner’s curse 
model has not been tested before. The ex ante uncertainty hypothesis was tested by 
Mok and Hui (1998), but they test only one proxy of ex ante uncertainty, i.e. the 
inverse of new funds raised. We use three proxies-the standard deviation of after-
market returns, the offer size and the age of firms, to examine the ex ante uncertainty 
hypothesis. In examining the signaling model, we test eight key empirical implications 
of the signaling model, some of which have been examined in Su and Fleisher (1999), 
but the methodology adopted and the conclusion made are different. 
Using data from November 1995 to December 1998, our results show that the 
winner’s curse hypothesis is the main reason for the high IPO underpricing in China. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation of the Study 
 Much evidence suggests that initial public offerings of common stock (IPOs) 
are systematically priced at a discount to their subsequent trading price (for 
review of international evidence, see Jenkinson and Ljunqvist (2001)). In 
attempting to explain the puzzle, many academic researchers have formulated 
different models. But no single explanation can account for the apparent 
underpricing of new issues in all the stock markets. Even within one market, 
one model on its own might not be sufficient to account for the full extent of 
IPO underpricing. 
 The last decades have seen phenomenal growth in the Chinese stock market 
both in the number o firms traded and dollar volume of shares traded, 
especially after early 1990s when the two stock exchanges were established 
(The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) in December 1990 and the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE) in July 1991). ). As of December 2002, there are more 
than one thousand companies listed on the two exchanges, with total market 
capitalization equal to about 50 percent of China’s gross domestic product 
(GDP). The combined market capitalization of the two stock exchanges has 
reached RMB 1  3,832.9 billion and the negotiable share capital hits RMB 
1,248.5 billion (more than that of Hong Kong, 1116.66 million HK$2). The 
                                                 
1 RMB is the abbreviation for Renminbi, which is the basic unit for Chinese currency. RMB has been 
pegged the US dollar at the exchange rate of about RMB 8 per US$1 during the sample period being 
studied. 
 






size of the Chinese stock market has become comparable to those of the 
industrialized countries and thus cannot be ignored (Allen and Gale 1995). In 
addition, China joined the world trade organization (WTO) in November 2001. 
Opening up its securities market has been put into the schedule of the Chinese 
government. So an understanding of the characteristics and performance of the 
Chinese IPO market would be of great value for investors and scholars at home 
and abroad. 
 The large underpricing magnitude in the Chinese IPO market has also attracted 
great attention. Mok and Hui (1998) report an underpricing3 of 289% for a 
sample of 87 Shanghai IPOs listed from 1990 to 1993. Su and Fleisher (1999) 
find the underpricing level as high as 948.6% for Chinese A-share IPOs before 
January 1, 1996. A more updated report is from Tian (2003), who found an 
average of 267% of initial returns for IPOs from 1991 through 2000. These 
reported underpricing levels in the Chinese market are much higher than the 
average level of 60% in the emerging markets (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 
2001). Despite many studies on the Chinese IPO underpricing, few studies 
have been done to investigate the reasons in light of classical IPO underpricing 
theories. Although previous studies such as Mok and Hui (1998), Su and 
Fleisher (1999), and Chau et al (1999) have explored some reasons for the high 
IPO underpricing, most of the studies examine few aspects that may affect IPO 
underpricing. For many markets, whether developed or emerging, IPO 
underpricing may be explained in terms of some classical IPO underpricing 
                                                 
3 Underpricing is defined as the pricing of an IPO at less than its market value. A possible measure of 
the degree of underpricing is (MV−P0)/MV, where P0 is the offer price and MV is the firm’s per-share 
market value on the offering date. Since MV is unknown on the offering date, many researchers use the 
initial return, (P1−P0)/P0, where P1 is the first-day closing price, as a measure of underpricing. We shall 






models such as asymmetric information models, institutional explanations and 
ownership and control (see Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). Tests of the 
Chinese IPO underpricing against classical IPO underpricing models are, 
however, far from comprehensive. This paper attempts to shed some light on 
this and examines a list of classical models of IPO underpricing for the 
Chinese market using data from November 1995 to December 1998. 
 
1.2 Objectives of the study 
Given the above motivation, this study has two major objectives. 
The first objective is to record the level of underpricing for IPOs in China over a 
relatively more current period. With this in mind, IPOs are examined in this study 
over period from November 1995 to December 1998. To filter out effects of offering 
methods on underpricing, I examine only the most commonly used online fixed 
pricing offerings (Shang Wang Ding Jia) in China. In total, 343 IPOs are analyzed 
over the period of interest. 
The second and perhaps more important objective of this study is to investigate 
possible explanations for the level of underpricing recorded, across various issues. 
This second area of study draws largely upon the existing models of IPO underpricing. 
I review the theoretical IPO underpricing models and analyze possible model 
explanations for the cross sectional difference in Chinese IPO underpricing. Based on 
possible explanation models and related literature, hypotheses are formulated and 
tested. The classical IPO underpricing models examined in this study are the winner’s 






Ritter, 1986) and the signaling model (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and 
Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989, 1996). 
By investigating the IPO phenomenon in the Chinese market, I hope to provide further 
insights on international IPO underpricing. 
 
1.3 Contribution of the study 
 Among those tested classical models, the winner’s curse model4 has not been 
tested before. The ex ante uncertainty hypothesis was tested by Mok and Hui 
(1998), but they test only one proxy of ex ante uncertainty, i.e. the inverse of 
new funds raised. We use three proxies-the standard deviation of after-market 
returns, the offer size and the age of firms, to examine the ex ante uncertainty 
hypothesis. In examining the signaling model, we test eight empirical 
implications of the signaling model, some of which have been examined in Su 
and Fleisher (1999), but the methodology adopted and the conclusion made are 
different. 
 My results show that investors’ high ex ante uncertainty about firm’s value and 
the winner’s curse problems are the main reasons for the high IPO 
underpricing in China. But the signaling hypothesis does not stand in the 
Chinese market during the sample period. 
 Given the prominence of the Chinese stock market in the emerging markets, 
the results should be able to shed some light on IPO underpricing for other 
                                                 
4 Wu (2001) finds a positive correlation between underpricing and allocation rate in China, which is in 
support of the winner’s curse model. However, other key implications of the winner curse model were 







emerging markets and provide further insights on international IPO 
underpricing. The results add more evidences on testing of the winner’s curse 
and signaling model as well. This should be illuminating and of value to both 
academicians and practitioners.  
 
1.4 Structure of the study. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the theoretical 
literature on IPO underpricing and provides a survey on Chinese primary market.  
Chapter 3 formulates the hypotheses to be examined and methodology adopted. 







Chapter 2   Models of IPO Underpricing and 




2.1 Models of IPO underpricing 
 
It has been a well-know empirical regularity in the IPO market that companies 
apparently underprice their shares when going public. Previous studies have shown a 
phenomenon of underpricing in virtually every country. The first day premium that 
investors experience is on average more than 15 percent in industrialized countries 
and around 60 percent in emerging markets (Jenkinson and Ljunqvist, 2001).  
In an efficient and perfect market, theory suggests, companies should not ‘leave 
money on the table’, certainly not in such large quantities. In trying to explain why 
firms are floated at too low a price, researchers have generated a large theoretical and 
empirical literature. Jenkinson and Ljunqvist sum up most of the studies on IPO 
underpricing in their book Going Public (Second Edition 2001). Briefly the IPO 
underpricing models include the following (refer to the book for details of each 
model): 
 
2.1.1 Asymmetric Information 
 
The most important modern theories of IPO underpricing arise from important 





underwriting distribution syndicate, the initial buyers and the larger set of investors in 
the secondary market. 
Most models of IPO pricing typically assume one group has superior information on 
firm value. Other agents know this and behave accordingly. Further everyone knows 
that everyone knows this, and so on ad infinitum.  
There are four informational assumptions one might make which accordingly lead to 
the four underpricing models. 
a) Assume a small group of investors has information superior to that of other 
investors and the issuer  
Rock’s (1986) asymmetric information model assumes that there are two groups of 
potential investors in the IPO markets: (1) ‘informed’ investors, those prepared to 
incur evaluation costs to assess the after-market performance of the offering and bid 
only of attractively priced IPOs; (2) ‘uninformed’ investors do not commit resources 
to acquire information and apply for every new issue coming into the market 
indiscriminately. Thus uninformed investors face competition for good shares, but 
have a higher probability of obtaining bad shares due to the rationing mechanism 
applied to oversubscribed offerings. Rock argues that the bias in rationing produces an 
equilibrium offer price with a finite discount sufficient to attract uninformed investors 
to the issue (assuming that the primary market is dependent on the continued 
participation of uninformed investors, in the sense that informed demand is 
insufficient to take up all shares on offer even in attractive offerings). This does not 
remove the allocation bias against the uninformed – they will still be crowded out by 
informed investors in the most underpriced offerings – but they will no longer make 





Curse” or “Adverse Selection” models. Implicit in the winner’s curse model is the 
notion that, if properly adjusted for risk and rationing, uninformed investors’ 
abnormal returns are zero, on average – that is just enough to ensure their continued 
participation in the market. Similarly, the informed investors’ conditional underpricing 
return should just provide a normal return on their information production. While the 
former is potentially testable, the latter is not, not least because informed and 
uninformed investors cannot in practice be distinguished.  Moreover, very few 
markets publish enough allocation data to allow underpricing returns to be adjusted 
for rationing. The evidence from countries use fixed price rather than book-building 
mechanisms, mostly supports the presence of a winner’s curse: in Singapore, the UK, 
and Finland initial returns do indeed tend to be zero when adjusted for rationing.  
b) Assume the issuer has better information on securities value than do the 
underwriter or investors.  
If the issuing firm is better informed about the present value and risk of its future cash 
flows than are investors or underwriters, underpricing may become a mean of 
convincing potential buyers of the “true” high value of the firm, i.e. underpricing as a 
signal of firm quality. Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and 
Welch (1989, 1996) have contributed theories of this underpricing signaling model. 
They hypothesize that underpricing allows “good” firms to distinguish themselves 
from “bad” firms and to improve terms of future external financing. 
Under this assumption, good quality issuers are assumed to maximize the expected 
proceeds of a two-stage sale: they sell a fraction of the firm at flotation and the 
remainder in a seasoned equity offering, henceforth, SEO. In the words of Ibbotson 





some positive probability, a firm’s true type is revealed before the post-IPO financing 
stage, introducing the risk to low-quality issuers that any cheating on their part will be 
detected before they can reap the benefit from the signal. This makes separation 
possible, in that it decreases the expected benefit from signaling to low-value firms 
and thus drives a wedge between high-value and low-value firms’ marginal signaling 
cost. Signaling true value is beneficial to a high-value company as it allows a higher 
price to be fetched at the second-stage sale if separation is achieved. 
c) Assume underwriters /distributors possess information superior to the issuer  
In the previous two models, underwriters do not have any particular role and thus 
potential agency problems between the underwriter managing the floatation and the 
issuing firm are ignored. Now if underwriters are better informed about investor 
demand than issuers, underwriters may earn information rents in an imperfectly 
competitive underwriter market, for instance in the form of sub-optimal selling effort. 
When the underwriter has valuable private information on market demand, the issuer 
will wish to learn this information. But the issuer must offer incentives to underwriter 
to truly reveal it. In order to secure truthful revelation of private information and 
encourage promotion efforts, the issuers may agree to a contract that leads to 
underpricing. This leads to the Principal-Agent models of the IPO. 
Baron and Holmstrom (1980) and Baron (1982) construct a screening model which 
focuses on the lead manager’s benefit from underpricing. In a screening model, the 
uninformed party offers a menu or schedule of contracts, from which the informed 
party selects the one that is optimal given her unobserved type and/or hidden action. 
The contract schedule is designed to optimize the uninformed party’s objective, which, 





To induce optimal use of the underwriter’s superior information about investor 
demand, the issuer delegates the pricing decision to the bank. Given his information, 
the underwriter self-selects a contract from a menu of combinations of IPO prices and 
underpricing spreads; if likely demand is low, he selects a high spread and a low price, 
and vice versa if demand is high5. This optimizes the underwriter’s unobservable 
selling effort by making it dependent on market demand. Compared with the first-best 
solution under symmetric information, the second-best incentive-compatible contract 
involves underpricing in equilibrium, essentially since his informational advantage 
allows the underwriter to capture positive rents in the form of below-first-best effort 
costs.  
d) Assume institutional investosrs know more than the issuer about the 
prospects for the company’s competitors or the economy as a whole.  Individual 
investors know their own demand while the underwriter doesn’t know 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) suggest that a key function of the investment bank that 
takes a company public is to elicit information from better-informed investors. In 
signaling models, issuers have the informational advantage. However it seems 
plausible that there is an information asymmetry running in the other direction. 
Institutional investors may know more than the issuers about the prospects for the 
company’s competitors or the economy as a whole because they are exposed to the 
flow of IPOs on a continuous basis. And even the least well informed investor knows 
something the issuer doesn’t: her own demand for the shares. So while the issuers 
know their own particular pieces of the jigsaw better than anyone else, investors hold 
other pieces of the same jigsaw which when put together give a clearer picture of the 
                                                 
5 There is empirical support for the notion of a menu of compensation contracts. Dunbar (1995) shows 






value of the company. The task of the underwriter is then to acquire as many jigsaw 
pieces as possible before setting the offer price. 
Underwriters underprice the issue in this case to elicit information from better-
informed investors. This forms the information revelation theories. But why would 
investors cooperate and reveal their information, especially when the information is 
positive? Benveniste and Spindt (1989) show that book building is a mechanism that 
induces investors to reveal their information truthfully. In book building, the book 
contains investors’ indications of interest (which can take the form of price-quantity 
bids, unlimited bids, or ‘soft’ information such as ‘give me what you’ve got’). These 
indications of interest can communicate the various jigsaw pieces the investors hold. 
To make sure that they do, the underwriter offers a stick and a carrot. The stick is that 
any investor who claims that here jigsaw piece looks unfavorable is allocated no or 
only very few shares. This mitigates the incentive to mispresent positive information. 
The carrot is that any investor who claims her jigsaw piece looks favorable (for 
instance via an aggressive indication of interest, such as bidding for a large quantity at 
a high price) is rewarded with a disproportionately high allocation of shares. Taken 
together, the stick and the carrot can ensure that an investor is never better off 
claiming bad news when the news is in fact good. 
To make sure this mechanism work, the underwriter underprices the issue. Effectively, 
an investor’s monetary reward for truthful reporting equals the number of shares 
allocated times dollar underpricing. 
One common empirical implication among three of the above asymmetric information 
models is that underpricing should increase in the ex ante uncertainty surrounding the 





an investor who decides to engage in information production implicitly invests in a 
call option on the IPO, which she will exercise if the ‘true’ price exceeds the strike 
price, the price at which the shares are offered to the public. The value of this option 
increases in the extent of valuation uncertainty, so more investors will become 
informed. This raises the required underpricing, since an increase in the number of 
informed traders aggravates the winner’s curse problem. Signaling model says that a 
noisier environment increases the extent of underpricing that is necessary to achieve 
separation. And principal-Agent model implies the same because the more uncertain 
the value of the firm, the greater the asymmetry of information between issuer and 
underwriter, and thus the more valuable the underwriter’s services become, resulting 
in greater underpricing. 
2.1.2 Institutional Explanations 
 
There are two main institutional underpricing models.  
a) Legal insurance hypothesis of underpricing 
The basic idea is that companies knowingly sell their stock at a discount to insure 
against further lawsuits from shareholders disappointed with the performance of their 
shares. In countries with stringent disclosure rules, underwriters and issuers are 
exposed to considerable litigation risk. Lawsuits are costly to the defendants, not only 
directly- legal fees, diversion of management time, etc.- but also in terms of the 
potential damage to their reputation capital.  Tinic (1988) and Hughes and Thakor 
(1992) argue that intentional underpricing may act as insurance against such securities 
litigation.  





Temporary price support in IPOs is legal in many countries including the USA, the 
UK, France, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands. In these countries underwriters 
can support prices by stimulating demand or by restricting supply in the after-market. 
They can stimulate demand either by posting bids at or below the offer price 
(stabilizing bids), or by actively buying back shares of weak offerings (stabilizing 
trades). Although inventory positions expose underwriters to considerate risk, Ellis et 
al. (2000) show that underwriters use their short positions to manage inventory risk. 
Underwriters typically oversell IPOs, by allocating 115 percent of shares on offer. If 
prices subsequently rise, they can cover their short position by exercising the over-
allotment option to buy another 15% of share from the issuer; if prices fall, they leave 
the over-allotment option unexercised and close out their short position by open-
market purchases instead. Either way, they make a profit. Ellis et al find that price 
support is not costly to underwriters because, as market makers, they earn trading 
commissions that are large enough to offset any losses they might suffer on their 
inventory. Trading profit, on the other hand, increase in initial underpricing, which 
might give underwriters an incentive to increase underpricing. 
Ruud (1991, 1993) argues that underwriters do not underprice deliberately and 
underpricing is a byproduct of price support. His starting point is from the statistical 
regularities of initial returns. Rather than forming a symmetric distribution around 
some positive mean, initial returns typically peak sharply at zero, are highly positively 
skewed, and include few negative observations. Ruud explains that underwriters price 
IPOs at expected market value and support those offerings whose prices fall below the 
offer price in after-market trading. Such behavior would tend to eliminate the left tail 





average price jump. According to Ruud, if price support suppresses the negative tail of 
the initial return distribution, companies merely appear to be underpriced on average. 
Asquith et al. (1998) investigate whether observed underpricing is a byproduct of 
price support. If Ruud is correct in saying that there is no deliberate underpricing, then 
the initial return distribution of unsupported offerings should have a mean of zero. 
This, however, is not what Asquith et al find.  
Ruud’s statistical view leaves many economic questions unanswered, such as why 
underwriters would want to provide price support. A number of studies such as 
Schultz and Zaman (1994), Prabhala and Puri (1999), Hanley et al (1993) and 
Benveniste et al (1996) offer different explanations of why underwriters provide price 
support, which will not be described in detail here. 
 
2.1.3 Ownership and Control 
Going public is, in many cases, a step towards the separation of ownership and control. 
Ownership matters for the effects it can have on the management’s incentives to make 
optimal operating and investment decisions. In particular, where the separation of 
ownership and control is incomplete, an agency problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
between non-managing and managing shareholders arises: managers may maximize 
the expected private utility of their control benefits at the expense of outsiders, rather 
than maximizing expected shareholder value.  
Two principal models have sought to rationalize the underpricing phenomenon within 
the bounds of an agency cost approach. Their predictions are diametrically opposed: 
while Brennan and Franks (1997) view underpricing as a means to entrench 





outsider shareholder, Stoughton and Zechner’s (1998) analysis instead suggests that 
underpricing may be used to minimize agency costs by encouraging monitoring.  
a) Underpricing as a Means to Retain Control 
Brennan and Franks (1997) develop a model in which underpricing gives managers a 
means to protect their private control benefit by allocating shares strategically when 
taking their company public. Managers would wish to avoid a single investor 
assembling a large stake for fear that their non-value-maximizing behavior would 
receive unwelcome scrutiny. By deliberately underpricing the flotation, they can 
ensure that the offer is over-subscribed and that investors will need to be rationed in 
their allocations. Rationing allows managers to discriminate between applicants of 
different sizes and so to reduce the block size of new shareholdings.  
b) Underpricing as a Means to Reduce Agency Costs  
There is one hidden assumption in Brennan-Franks’ model that managers try to 
maximize their expected private utility by entrenching their control benefit. Actually 
managers may wish to allocate the issue in a way that minimizes, rather than 
maximizes their scope for discretion. Managers are part –owners of a company, they 
bear some of the costs of their own non-profit maximizing behavior. Stoughton and 
Zechner (1998) observe that, in contrast to Brennan and Franks, it may be value 
enhancing to allocate shares to large outsider investor who is able to monitor 
managerial actions. Monitoring is a public good. Since any large shareholder will 
monitor only in so far as this is privately optimal, there will be underinvestment in 
monitoring from the point of view of both shareholders and incumbent managers. To 
encourage better monitoring, managers may try to allocate a particularly large stake to 






Different models explain different situations in different countries. Some models are 
not possible explanations for IPO underpricing in a particular country because of the 
country’s stock market characteristics. The Chinese stock market characteristics 
determine that some IPO underpricing models do not apply in China, but the 
characteristics do provide a unique situation where certain pmodels can be relatively 
clearly examined. Section 2.2 describes features of the Chinese primary market; 
section 2.3 summarizes previous studies on the Chinese IPO underpricing. In section 
2.4, I will analyze comprehensively which classical IPO underpricing models are 
possible explanation for Chinese IPO underpricing according to the Chinese market 
features and previous findings.  
 
2.2 Features of the Chinese Primary Market 
2.2.1 The pre-offer process 
The IPO decision in China is made on the basis of political considerations as well as 
profitability considerations. Every year, the Chinese authorities (the State Planning 
Committee, the Central Bank, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission) 
determine the total number of issues allowed and which firms can make issues.  
The process begins when the State Planning Commission lays out its annual financing 
plan for state enterprises. After the calculations and political balancing, a total figure 
representing capital to be raised by all listings is entered into the State Plan regardless 
of market conditions. The non-state sector has seldom been included in the thinking 
about which enterprises should be enabled to finance through the sale of securities. 
Thus equity financing for Chinese companies via either the domestic or the 





listing process in China is also a process of restructuring and packaging SOEs into 
shareholding companies and a process of privatization. 
Once the China central authorities have set the overall quota, each province is 
allocated a sub-quota. The stated criteria used for allocation of new issues among 
provinces reflect the central security regulatory authorities’ perceived regional 
development needs and provincial differences in production structure and industrial 
base. Within each regional quota, the local security regulatory authorities invite 
enterprises to apply a listing and make a selection based on some criteria6. These 
criteria include the performance and sectoral development objectives of the enterprise. 
Local government selection criteria take into account the profitability and 
performance criteria of the exchanges.   
Once approval for an issue has been obtained an investment syndicate will be formed 
to draw up a detailed plan. Securities companies will perform the standard services of 
providing advice, underwriting and distributing shares to the public, as well as 
developing a secondary market in them. The underwriting market in China is 
relatively competitive and there are 129 firms providing underwriting services. Table 
2.1 shows that the top ten underwriters occupy 64.8 percent of the IPO market. All of 
them are state owned companies and most of them are associated with the government 
and are very well connected to the regulation authority (Tian L. G. 2003). A-share 
issues are underwritten by domestic brokerage firms owned by the state, foreign share 
                                                 
6 A prerequisite for firms to get floated is to satisfy the conditions stipulated in the Company Law. The 
conditions stipulated in the Company Law enacted in December 1999 are: 
i. Total share capital not less than RMB 50 million 
ii. With an operating history of at least three years and a continuous profitability over the past 3 
years. 
iii. No less than 1000 shareholders holding shares paper-valued RMB1000 or above; More than 
25 percent of total shares offered to the public. 





issues are underwritten by prestigious financial institutions with international 
reputations. 











1 Guotai Jun'an Securities Co. 238 1560.2 15.8  Central Bank 
2 Shenyin Wan'guo Securities 
Co. 
182 930.1 9.42  Shanghai Govt. 
3 Nangang Securities Co. 123 824.3 8.35  Central Bank 
4 Huaxia Securities Co. 81 600.8 6.08  Central Bank 
5 CITIC Securities Co. 62 499.5 5.06  State Council 
6 Haitong Securities Co. 81 487.7 4.94  Shanghai Govt. 
7 Guangfa Securities Co. 79 433.5 4.39  Guangdong Govt. 
8 Everbright Securities Co. 54 394.4 3.99  State Council 
9 Gousen Securities co. 63 338.9 3.43  Shenzhen Govt. 
10 United Securities Co. 25 329.9 3.34  37 National SOEs 
Source: Tian L. G. (2003) 
2.2.2 Type of Shares in the Chinese stock market 
 
In the privatization process, the Chinese government introduced 5 major categories of 
shares to allow ownership of state-owned enterprises to be dispersed among the 
government itself, state-owned enterprises, firm’s own employees, domestic public 
and foreign investors.  
(1) State shares, which are owned by the state and its various ministries, bureaus and 
regional governments. They are not tradable. 
(2) Legal entity shares, which can only be held by State-Owned Enterprises and/or the 
foreign partner of a corporatized joint venture. These shares are highly illiquid. They 
cannot be listed in the two official exchanges (SHSE and SZSE), but they can be sold 
to other legal entities through the nation-wide computerized system called STAQS 






One distinguishing ‘Chinese characteristic’ is that the majority shareholding of 
equities are non-negotiable government shares and legal entity shares. In my sample 
of 343 IPOs from Nov 1995 through Dec 1998, 65% of A-shares outstanding are held 
by the state and the legal entities. Individual investors own only 35% of shares. This 
means that, on average, only about 35% of total shares outstanding are traded publicly 
on either the SHSE or SZSE. 
(3) Employee shares, which are those shares issued by the listed company and offered to 
managers and employees prior to those offered to the public. These shares are initially 
prohibited from trading for a certain period of time (typically 6 months or 3 years in 
China). After that they become tradable A-shares. 
(4) Ordinary domestic shares or A-shares designated only for private Chinese citizens and 
traded on SHSE and SZSE. In terms of size and level of activity, the A-share market 
dominates China’s equity markets. A-shares can only be bought and sold by individual 
or legal persons within the PRC and are RMB dominated. Overseas investors are not 
permitted to purchase A-shares unless they purchase authorized joint venture mutual 
funds. 
(5) Foreign shares, designated only for foreign investors to be traded on security 
exchanges in China (B shares), in Hong Kong (H shares) or on the NYSE (N shares) 7. 
2.2.3 The Issuing Mechanism 
 
In established markets three methods are normally used in making initial public 
offerings, fixed price, book building and auction. In China, the offering mechanism 
adopted is mainly fixed price offerings, but it is quite complicated and different from 
those of developed markets.  
                                                 





The share offering mechanism in China has gone through several stages of reforms 
(see Appendix A).  The most commonly used method after 1995, however, is the 
online fixed price offering methods called ‘Shang Wang Ding Jia’. This online fixed 
price offering method 8  was first introduced in 1994, in which investors bid for 
quantities, with pro-rata allocation in the event of oversubscription. Investors need to 
pay a full subscription deposit but with repayment for unsuccessful applicants around 
one week after subscription. This offering method has proved a more efficient 
procedure and meets with the approval of investors. It has become the major offering 
method from 1996 till the year 2002.  
The offer price in the fixed price offering is chosen according to the formula of taking 
the after tax profits per share multiplied by a price earning ratio (PE), the latter being 
set in relation to the price earnings ratios of listed companies in the same locality and 
industry. However, The PE ratio changes in accordance with the guidance of CSRC 
(China Securities Regulatory Commission). Otherwise the IPOs will not get approval. 
The CSRC often imposes a ceiling on the PE ratio, which prevents prices from being 
set in relation to an individual firm’s characteristics and growth potential. Moreover 
the ceiling changes over time. Before 1999, the ceiling level was controlled at 15. In 
January 1999, the ceiling restriction was loosened and the PE ratio used in IPO pricing 
raises to as high as 50 until the year 2002 when a ceiling of 20 was re-imposed. Not 
                                                 
8 In the online fixed price offering, the lead underwriter uses the exchange trading system to sell new 
stocks at a fix price and investors apply new stocks through the existing buy order at a designated time. 
Investors must have one stock account and one cash account and enough full payment funds deposited 
in their cash account prior to application. The number of shares applied must be in whole lots. A lot is 
1,000 shares. 
The application movement is like this: 
1st day  Investors apply   
2nd-3rd days  Exchange validates investors’ deposit funds and allocates one serial number to  
   each lot applied and investors affirm their application serial numbers. 
4th day   Lead underwriter organizes balloting     
5th day   Lead underwriter publicizes the balloted winning serial numbers on designated papers. 







only the PE ratio affected by the authority’s policy, but also the after-tax profits per 
share used in the IPO pricing. For example, from end 1995 to February 1997, the 
regulated after-tax profit took the average level of one year before IPO and the IPO 
year; from March 1997 to February 1998, the after-tax profit adopted the three year 
average prior to IPO; while from February 1998 to March 1999, the after-tax profit per 
share equals to the estimated after-tax profit per share for the IPO year. 
In the fixed price offering, pro-rata allocation is used to allocate the overwhelming 
applications. But the pro-rata allocation in China takes the form of random allocation 
rules, where balloting chooses the investors. The ballot ratio used equals to the 
number of shares publicly offered divided by the number of shares investors 
subscribed. Therefore there is an inverse relation between the demand for new issues 
and the allocation rate. 
2.2.4 Supervision and Regulations 
 
One requirement for a well-functioning market concerns supervision and this may be 
provided through government legislation and/or internal regulation. Reliable and fair 
trading procedures can increase investors’ confidence and help safeguard their 
interests. During the period under study, the State Council Securities Commission (the 
"SCSC") and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (the "CSRC") were 
responsible for supervising and regulating the securities market. The SCSC, 
established in October 1992, is the State authority responsible for exercising 
centralized market regulation. The CSRC, also established in October 1992, is the 
SCSC's executive branch responsible for conducting supervision and regulation of the 
securities markets in accordance with the law and regularities. In November 1998, the 





reform and reorganize the national securities regulatory mechanism. The local 
securities regulatory departments will be supervised directly. Organizations engaged 
in securities formerly supervised by the People's Bank of China were put under the 
centralized supervision of the CSRC. But it was until July 1999 the first securities law 
was enacted, which provided a consistent legal framework for the securities industry 
and stock market in China. In general, before 1999, in terms of supervision and 
regularities, the Chinese stock market is immature, compared with a fully-fledged 
stock market in a developed market.  
2.2.5 Other Characteristics Related to This Study 
 
In China, almost all IPOs are oversubscribed (in my sample of fixed price offerings, 
there is no under subscription) due to an extremely high demand relative to its limited 
supply of new issues. Before the emergence of stock markets, Chinese households had 
access to a very limited number of investment instruments, mainly savings deposits at 
relatively low interest rates. Miurin and Sommariva (1993) describe how the lack of 
consumer goods and financial instruments forced Chinese individuals to invest in 
fixed-rate bank deposits that provide a negative real return during inflationary period 
that started in the early 1980s. At the same time, China’s household savings rate was 
one of the world’s highest, about 40 percent of total disposable income. Chen (1995) 
reports the results of surveys of Chinese citizens indicating that about 80% of the 
respondents desired to participate in the market but was unable to do so. Of those 
investors in the market, about 83 percent indicated the intention to increase their stock 
investment. On the other hand, the aggregate value of new shares to be issued is 
limited by the national investment and credit plan. Therefore there has been a 





It is also noteworthy that seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) are very frequently 
observed among Chinese issuers and that SEOs account for a substantial portion of 
shares issued. About 91percent of the Chinese firms that went public before 1 July 
1994 issued seasoned equities before 1 January 1996 (Su and Fleisher, 1999). Kim et 
al (2000) also reports that in their sample IPOs from 1992 through 1995, 
approximately 64 percent go back to the market to raise additional equity capital in the 
three years after IPO. 
Another characteristic of the Chinese stock market related to my study is that the 
accounting report and market regulatory system in China are relatively primitive and 
incomplete (Aharony et al., 2000; Xiang, 1998). The auditing standards in Chinese 
stock market are also generally perceived to be low (Aharony et al 2000). There is far 
less corporate disclosure in China than that of developed countries. Private investors’ 
major source of information is the IPO prospectuses, which unfortunately are not 
reliable under the existing accounting and auditing standard. This makes individual 
investors difficult to evaluate an IPO before investing. Furthermore A-shares are sold 
to relatively unsophisticated private individual investors who usually do not commit 
much time and recourses on IPO firm evaluation (while B shares are sold primarily to 
international institutional investors such as foreign mutual funds). Therefore investors 
lack information about the true quality of the firm going public and there are big ex 
ante uncertainties about the issuing firm’s value. 
 
2.3 Prior Studies of the Chinese IPO underpricing 
 
There are some papers documenting the extraordinarily high underpricing of Chinese 





papers report the mean initial returns range from 127 percent to 949 percent and 
present a number of determinants of underpricing, including time gap, offering size, 
issuer’s fractional ownership etc. Most of the studies examine only a few determinant 
factors instead of testing the classical IPO underpricing models comprehensively 
except that Mok and Hui examined the ex ante risk and Su and Fleisher examined the 
signaling model. Mok and Hui find that the high equity retention by the state, a long 
time-lag between offering and listing and ex ante risk of new issues were key-
determinants of market adjusted IPO underpricing. Su and Fleisher examined the 
signaling model comprehensively and find that the Chinese IPO underpricing is a 
strategy for firms to signal their value to investors. They also investigate the effect of 
offering mechanism on IPO underpricing and find that IPO underpricing is the largest 
under the lottery with a fixed number of lottery-forms and is the smallest under the 
auction mechanism.  Wu (2001) reports that subscription rate in China is positively 
related to IPO underpricing in support of winner’s curse model. She also finds that 
there is no significant relationship between the underwriter’s reputation and the degree 
of IPO underpricing. A more recent study by Tian (2003) argues that the listing quota 













Findings pertaining to the explanations of the IPO underpricing 
Mok and Hui (1998) 87 1990-1993 289 The high equity retention by the state, a long time-lag between offering and listing and 
ex ante risk of new issues were the key-determinants of the underpricing. 
Kim et al (1998) 45 1993 594 IPOs for which a larger percentage of total shares are sold to individual investors are 
more underpriced and IPOs of firms that are expected to have larger increases in 
profitability are less underpriced , which is consistent with the political persuasion 
hypothesis. 
Su and Fleisher (1999) 101 1987-1995 949 The signaling hypothesis explains the pattern of underpricing behavior rather well. In 
examining the effect of the offering mechanism on IPO underpricing they find the 
underpricing to be the largest under the lottery with a fixed number of lottery-forms and 
is the smallest under the auction mechanism.   
Chau et al (1999) 102 1990-1993 546 Investors in previously centrally planned economies view agency costs as a consideration 
in investment; Initial returns are smaller when the government retains a large proportion 
of ownership and initial returns are negatively related to firm size. Investors rely on 
insider ownership to reduce agency costs. 
Chen et al (2000) 277 1992-1995 350 The state underprices to ensure future seasoned equity issues to be successful; The long- 
time lag from the offering date to the first trading date explain the high underpricing; A-
share IPOs that subsequently make rights issues are significantly more underpriced.  
Wu (2001) 840 1990-2000 218 Subscription rate is positively related to IPO underpricing; there is no significant 
relationship between underwriter's reputation and underpricing;  
Chi and Padgett (2002) 340 1996-1997 127 The quota system for new issues is the main reason for the underpricing 
Tian (2003) 1124 1991-2000 267 The listing quota and pricing caps imposed by the government account for more than 
half of the severe underpricing. Information on the quality of the firm causes IPO 
underpricing, but it is not a major determinant. Besides the effects of the financial 
regulations, Chinese-specific investment risks also contribute to severe underpricing. The 
long time lag from the IPO date to the first trading date causes the underpricing. 
Note: This table describes only studies on the Chinese IPO underpricing. Research on other aspects of the Chinese stock market such as the long term IPO after-
market performance, the development of China’s privatization program, the price behavior of listed companies, or the relationships between company value and 






2.4 Possible Explanations for Chinese A-share IPO 
Underpricing 
 
The Chinese stock market characteristics determine that some IPO underpricing 
models do not apply in China, but the characteristics do provide a unique situation 
where certain models can be relatively clearly examined as well. 
As shown above that the major offering mechanisms in China does not have any 
pricing or rationing bias. This suggests that the first two models of ownership and 
control will not apply since these two models need rationing discrimination as means 
to realize the control ends. 
In the Chinese IPO market, there is no book building offering mechanism until the 
year 2001, therefore information revelation can’t possibly explain the high level of 
underpricing, at least before 2001.The lawsuit idea is a US-centric model, which fails 
in the international context: underpricing is a global phenomenon, while strict liability 
laws are not. The risk of being sued is not economically significant in Australia (Lee 
et al. 1996), Finland (Keloharju 1993b), Germany (Ljungqvist 1995a), Japan (Beller 
et al.1992, Macey and Kanda 1990) Sweden (Rydqvist 1994), Switzerland (Kunz and 
Aggarwal 1994), or the UK (Jenkinson 1990), all of which experience underpricing. 
As an emerging stock market, China did not have a complete securities law in force 
until July 1999; the risk of being sued is not economically significant. Therefore the 
lawsuit hypothesis does not apply here. Price support is prohibited in Chinese stock 
market; neither can price support underwritten underpricing explain the Chinese IPO 
underpricing.  
As to the principal-agent hypothesis, on one hand underwriters do not have much of 







underwriting line; on the other it is not a problem for underwriters to place all 
available stock with investors due to the extremely high demand. In western countries, 
securities companies underwrite stock issues at a price decided through negotiation 
with the issuing company. There is a risk involved in the underwriting: when 
securities companies fail to sell all the stocks they purchase, they have to lower the 
selling price since according to the regulations in some countries they cannot hold 
these unsold stocks. It is thus of vital importance for the underwriter to get the right 
price for the stock they underwrite. In China things are different. Although like their 
western counterparts, the Chinese issuing companies also preferred to have a high 
premium price for their shares, the securities companies in China are, however, 
willing to do so in order to attract more business. This is because the demand for 
shares is always high. There is no risk of shares being unsold, and even if such a risk 
does exist, the unsold shares could always be stored for future sale.  So getting 
underwriting contracts can almost guarantee profit for securities companies. Therefore, 
without rent seeking or moral hazard problems, the principal-agent model cannot 
possibly explain the Chinese IPO underpricing. 
Winner’s curse problem is a possible explanation for Chinese IPO underpricing. There 
are mainly two types of investors in the Chinese stock market: individual investors 
and institutional investors. Table 2.2 shows the structure of investors as of 1998. The 
vast majority of investors in the Chinese market are individuals who can be regarded 
as uninformed investors. The small portion of institutional investors might function as 
informed investors. 
                   (In thousands) 
Table 2.3 The Structure of Domestic Investors in 1998 







Institutional Investors 62.6 93.2 155.8
Individual Investors 19927.1 19024.1 38951.2
Total 19989.7 19117.3 39107
Source: China Security Year Book 1999 
 
Rock’s winner’s curse model is examined only in countries where there are data on 
allocation rate to subscribers (Koh and Walter, 1989; Levis, 1990; Keloharju, 1993; 
Amihud et al, 2003). Fortunately we are able to have the allocation data in China. As 
described before, In China, all applications of different sizes have an equal probability 
of being accepted and the probability (ballot ratio) is publicly announced after IPOs. 
This feature enables us to examine the adverse selection model in the Chinese market.  
Due to weakness in disclosure and auditing standards, investors lack information 
about the true quality of the firm going public. A relatively high degree of investor 
uncertainty affects the IPO pricing. As mentioned before, the Winner’s Curse model, 
the signaling model and Principal-Agent model all suggest a positive correlation 
between ex ante uncertainty and underpricing. Mok and Hui (1998) argue that proxies 
for ex ante uncertainty explains the pattern of A-share IPO returns for a sample of 87 
Shanghai firms that went public during the years 1990-1993. Thus ex ante uncertainty 
could also be one of the main reasons for Chinese IPO underpricing. 
High degree of investor uncertainty also means that the information asymmetry 
between the investors and the issuers is high. This provides incentives for good quality 
issuers to underprice to signal their firm value. Moreover the frequent observation of 
SEOs among Chinese issuers also proves that signaling might be a good explanation 
for underpricing. Su and Fleisher (1999) find that the signaling hypothesis explains 







in support of the signaling hypothesis are: 1) the correlation between the degree of 
IPO underpricing and initial offer price for the proportion of the firm offered to the 
public is negative, given the issuer’s retained ownership. 2) the degree of IPO 
underpricing is positively related to proxies for the issuer’s intrinsic value, the 
variance o future returns, and the issuer’s fractional ownership. 3) issuers with larger 
IPO underpricing are more likely to raise larger amounts of capital through SEOs and 
to do so more quickly than issuers with a smaller degree of IPO underpricing, 
although the latter relationship is weak. Mok and Hui (1998) also find a positive 
relationship between the issuer’s ownership and IPO underpricing in support of the 
signaling hypothesis. 
In summary of chapter 2, the IPO underpricing literature has provided rich 
explanations for the financial anomaly of IPO underpricing. These underpricing 
models are mainly divided into three categories: asymmetric information, institutional 
explanations and ownership and control explanations. Considering the situations in the 
Chinese market, I eliminate all models under the last two categories. Among the 
asymmetric information explanations, I narrow down the possible Chinese IPO 
underpricing explanations to the winner’s curse model, ex ante uncertainty 
explanation and the signaling model. In the rest of the study I am going to focus on 
examining the winner’s curse model, ex ante uncertainty explanation and the signaling 
model in the Chinese A-share market among which the winner’s curse model9 has not 
been examined before. The ex ante uncertainty hypothesis was tested by Mok and Hui 
(1998), but they tested only one proxy for ex ante uncertainty, i.e., the inverse of new 
funds raised. We consider 3 proxies−the standard deviation of after-market returns, the 
                                                 
9 Wu (2001) finds a positive correlation between underpricing and allocation rate in China in support of 
the winner’s curse model. But other key implications of the winner curse model were not tested. 








offer size and the age of firms, to examine the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis. In 
examining the signaling model, we test eight empirical implications of the signaling 
model, some of which have been examined in Su and Fleisher (1999), but the 











Chapter 3 Hypotheses and Methodology 
 
 
This chapter describes the hypotheses and methodologies adopted in this study to 
examine the winner’s curse model, ex ante uncertainty explanation and the signaling 
model.  
 
3.1 The Winner’s Curse Model 
 
Rock (1986) proposes that high positive returns observed in IPOs cannot be earned in 
practice because of adverse selection. Uninformed investors are allocated greater 
quantities in overpriced IPOs and smaller quantities in underpriced IPOs. This is 
because investors who are informed about the issuing company’s value select to invest 
in underpriced IPOs only. Underpricing is then needed to attract uninformed investors. 
In equilibrium, “weighting the returns by the probabilities of obtaining an allocation 
should leave the uninformed investor earning the riskless rate” (Rock 1986).  
Therefore we expect: 
H1: After ration-adjusted, uninformed investors tend to earn the riskless  rate. 
Rock’s model assumes that uninformed investors invest in IPOs indiscriminately. 








amount of shares for each and every IPO. And their allocation-weighted initial return 











−−−=    (1) 
where  
AWIR is allocation-weighted initial return measured from the application-close 
date to the initial-listing date  
P1  is   closing price on the first day of trading 
P0 is   IPO offer price 
BALLOT is  ballot ratio used in lottery, i.e. the allocation rate 
(I1-I0) /I0 is  A-share composite index return from IPO date to first trading date in 
corresponding stock exchanges, my proxy for market return. I1 is the 
corresponding stock exchange closing price of A-share composite index 
on the first trading date; I0 is the corresponding stock exchange closing 
price of A-share composite index on the IPO date. 
The first part on the right hand side of equation (1) is the allocation-weighted initial 
return without adjusting of the market factor. The second part is the A-share composite 
index11 return from IPO date to first trading date. Interest cost associated with the 
                                                 
10 In the fixed price offering, unsuccessful parts of application deposit are refunded around one week 
after the IPO subscription date. However, since the interest rate is extremely low in the Chinese market 
(average one-week interest rate in the study period is close to zero, 0.039%) and there are few other 
investment opportunities, it does not make much a difference for investors to get the deposit money 
back. Therefore, here I treat the application deposit frozen until the first trading date. 
 
11 Following other studies, I use the Shanghai A-share composite index and the Shenzhen A-share 
composite index as corresponding market benchmarks. They are capitalization-weighted indices using 








application is ignored because of the extremely low interest rate. Hypothesis H1 states 
that AWIR is approximately equal to the riskless rate of interest. 
Rock’s (1986) winner’s curse model also implies a negative correlation between initial 
returns and allocations to investors. Since informed investors avoid overpriced IPOs, 
uninformed investors receive larger allocations of shares on which they earn negative 
returns and smaller allocations in underpriced IPOs. Thus the joint participation by 
both informed and uninformed investors in underpriced IPOs makes the demand for 
underpriced IPOs high, thus allocation rate low. My second hypothesis to test Rock’s 
model is to examine the relation between underpricing and allocation rate. 
H2:  IPO initial returns are inversely correlated to allocations with investors. 
This relationship can be examined by the following simple OLS regression  
εββ ++= BALLOTTIR 10      (2) 
where IR is the initial returns and BALLOTT is the logistic transformation of the ballot 
ratio12: 
)1/()log( αα +−+= BALLOTBALLOTBALLOTT    (3) 
The logistic transformation is used here to accommodate the cases where BALLOT is 
practically 0 or 1. We expect β1 in equation (2) to be negative and significant.  
 
3.2 Ex ante uncertainty  
 
Another key empirical implication of the winner’s curse model, pointed out by Ritter 
(1984) and formalized in Beatty and Ritter (1986), is that underpricing should increase 
                                                 









in the ex ante uncertainty surrounding an issue. The underpinning is that higher 
uncertainty leads to proportionally more informed-investors, which deteriorates the 
winner’s curse problem (see chapter 2). Other testable implications of winner’s curse 
model are basically elicited from this relationship between ex ante uncertainty and 
underpricing. For example, Carter and Manaster (1990), Johnson and Miller (1988), 
James and Wier (1990) and many other researchers tested the relationship between the 
underwriter’s reputation and initial returns as evidence of adverse selection since it is 
argued that more prestigious underwriters can reduce the informational asymmetry 
and thereby cut the underpricing cost. Another explanation is that hot issue periods are 
characterized by a higher level of ex ante uncertainty, necessitating higher 
underpricing (Ritter, 1984). 
However these relationships are not unique to adverse selection model.  As discussed 
in section 2, the signaling model and principal-agent model imply the same. Therefore 
I will test the ex ante uncertainty explanation separately. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) assert that the degree of underpricing is directly related to the 
ex ante uncertainty about the value of the IPO. Their proposition supported by Rock 
(1986) states that the greater the ex ante uncertainty about the value of IPO, the 
greater the expected underpricing. In other words, more underpricing cost is needed 
for firms with greater ex ante uncertainty. In the Chinese market, there are large ex 
ante uncertainties about IPO values (see chapter 2). Therefore ex ante uncertainty 
might be one of the main reasons for the high IPO underpricing observed from the 
Chinese market. 
Researchers have been using variance of the aftermarket returns of IPOs (Ritter 1984, 








1984, 1991; Megginson and Weiss 1991), offer size (Beatty and Ritter 1986; 
McGuinness 1992) and underwriter’s reputation (Carter and Manaster, 1990; Johnson 
and Miller, 1988; James and Wier, 1990) as proxies for measuring ex ante uncertainty 
of the IPOs. It is easy to understand that the higher the standard deviation of 
aftermarket returns the higher the ex ante uncertainty of the IPO firms. Large and old 
companies should have less ex ante risk than small and young ones because there is 
more information about them and because they are likely to be more closely 
monitored by the government and regulatory authorities.  I am not going to use 
underwriter’s reputation as a proxy in this study because the Chinese A-share issues 
are underwritten by domestic state-owned security companies and there are no 
prestigious financial institutions with international reputations involved. Furthermore 
Wu (2001) finds that underwriter’s reputation has no significant effect on the degree 
of underpricing in the Chinese new issue’s market.  The rest of three proxies for ex 
ante uncertainties predict that the larger the variance of the aftermarket returns of IPOs, 
the younger the age of the issuing firms and the smaller the offering size, the higher 
the uncertainty about the value of IPO firms and therefore the more underpriced of 
corresponding IPOs. Thus we would expect: 
H3: The standard deviation of aftermarket returns of IPOs is positively related to IPO 
underpricing. 
H4: The offer size of the firm is inversely related to IPO underpricing. 
H5: The age of the firm is inversely related to IPO underpricing. 
I use a multiple linear regression model to examine the explanatory power of ex ante 
uncertainty and control for other well-known determinants of IPO underpricing. The 








uncertainty are SD, AGE and IPOSZ, where SD is standard deviation of returns over 
days from 1 to 100 after IPO, AGE is the age of a firm in years from the establishment 
date to the date of IPO, and IPOSZ is the number of shares offered at IPO times the 
IPO offer price.  
Other variables that might affect the level of ex ante uncertainty are also controlled for.  
The first one is the market return before IPO. Ritter (1984) asserts that hot issue 
period is characterized by a higher level of ex ante uncertainty, which necessitates 
higher underpricing. There has been overwhelming evidence that underpricing is 
higher in buoyant stock markets: Davis and Yeomans (1976) (UK), Reilly (1977) 
(USA), McGuiness (1992) (Hong Kong) and Rydqvist (1990) (Sweden) all show that 
initial returns tend to be higher following periods of high returns on the market index. 
To test if Chinese IPOs are more heavily underpriced when the market is performing 
well, I use BFMARTN, percentage change in the A-share composite index 3 months 
prior to the issue, as one of the explanatory variables. Another control variable is the 
issuers’ fractional ownership. In an emerging market with high information 
asymmetry, the domestic investors interpret a high percentage of equity retention by 
the state as government confidence and a business guaranty. That is high equity 
retention by the state lowers ex ante uncertainty (Mok and Hui 1998). The time gap 
elapsed between the IPO date and first trading date can also affect level of ex ante 
uncertainty. Chowdry and Sherman (1996) demonstrate that an increasing lag between 
the fixing of the offer price and the beginning of trading results in bigger ex ante 
uncertainty and more IPO underpricing. Mok and Hui (1998) and Su and Fleisher 
(1999) reported a very high time gap between offering and listing time in the Chinese 








independent variables. Other control variables include year dummies, industry 












If H3, H4 and H5 hold, we expect β1 to be positive, and β2 and β3 to be negative. If the 
ex ante uncertainty hypothesis stands, we also expect positive β4 and β6 and negative 
β5. 
For convenience of reference, I list all variables used below: 
RAWIR (P1-P0)/P0    
IR market adjusted initial return equals to RAWIR minus A-share index 
return from IPO date to first trading date, (P1-P0)/P0-(I1-I0)/I0 
AGE  age of a firm in years from the establishment date to the date of IPO 
IPOSZ number of shares offered at IPO times IPO offer price SD Standard 
deviation of aftermarket stock returns over days from 1 to 100 after 
IPO OWNSHP  the proportion of shares owned by the government, 
legal entities and employees after IPOs 
LAG  days elapsed between IPO date and the first trading date 
YRD year dummies: Y96 equals to 1 for IPOs made in 1996 (including one 
IPO in November and one in December 1995), Y97 equals to 1 for 
IPOs made in 1997, Y98 equals to 1 for IPOs made in 1998. 
IND industry dummies: IN2 utilities, IN3 properties, IN4 conglomerates, 








EXD exchange dummies, STKCDSH is a dummy for IPOs listed on 
Shanghai Securities Exchange and STKCDSZ are IPOs listed on 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
BFMARTN percentage change in the A share composite index 3 months prior to the 
issue. 
The following are variables that are going to be used in latter part of this study. I list 
them all here for convenience of reference. 
AFTRTN Abnormal return over the period from trading day 1 to trading day 400 
after the IPO date. The abnormal return equals to [(P400-P1)/P1]-[(I400-
I1)/I1)] where P400 is the 400th day closing price of the stock and I400 is 
the 400th day closing price of the corresponding exchange A-share 
composite index. 
SEOSZ  number of shares offered at first SEO times SEO price 
SEOSZ/MKT SEO size as a fraction of market value of equity one day before the 
SEO announcement 
TIMESEO number of days elapsed between the IPO and SEO first trading date 
REACT Excess return around the date when the firm announces its SEO. The 
excess return is estimated over the event days -1 through +4, where day 
0 is the SEO announcement date, and equals to [(P4-P-1)/P-1]-[(I4-I-1)/I-
1], where P4 is the 4th day closing price of the stock and I4 is the 4th day 
closing price of the corresponding exchange A-share composite index 
after the SEO announcement (the SEO announcement date is taken as 








V Firm’s intrinsic value equals to 400 trading days aftermarket abnormal 
return (same as AFTRTN). 
V1  firm’s market capitalization on the first trading day, equals to the first 
day closing price times the number of shares offered at IPO 
SEOPRC/TRDPRC SEO price over the closing price one day before the SEO 
announcement date 
NK  Firm’s total net asset after the issue 
Y2ROA firm’s return on assets two years after IPO 
 
 
3.3 The signaling model 
 
Group 1 - Correlations among IPO underpricing and issuer’s 
intrinsic value, fractional ownership and project variance 
 
Leland and Pyle (1977) developed one of the first IPO valuation-signaling models. 
They modeled IPO firm current value as a positive function of the proportionate share 
ownership of the entrepreneurs who bring the company to listing. The intuition behind 
this model is that entrepreneurs who retain a large fraction of shares only do so if they 
are very confident about the firm’s prospects. Investors recognize this commitment by 
the entrepreneur and place a higher valuation on the IPO.  
H6: Positive relationship between the issuer’s fractional ownership and  firm value  
Downes and Heinkel (1982) design an empirical test of Leland and Pyle’s theoretical 








  εαβββ +++= ˆ1 210 IPOSZV      (5)                          
Where V1 is the firm’s market capitalization on the first trading date, equals to the 
first day closing price times the number of shares outstanding, α is the issuer’s 
proportional ownership and αˆ = α +ln(1- α), the Leland and Pyle’s signal of a firm’s 
future cash flow13, as a function of α. Based on this construction, 2β  is expected to 
have a negative sign. ε  is a disturbance term. Downes and Heinkel’s regression model 
assumed constant risk across all firms. To account for different risks across firms, I 
incorporate a risk term in the above equation, using the ex post variability in the stock 
market returns as a proxy for ex ante risk: 
  εβαβββ ++++= SDIPOSZ 3210 ˆ1V     (6) 
where αˆ = α +ln(1- α) and α equals to OWNSHP. So if Leland and Pyle’s ownership 
signaling model stands, we expect a negative 2β .  Higher risk should be compensated 
with more returns. Grinblatt and Hwang (1989)’s signaling model also implies that, 
keeping the issuer’s fractional holding constant, the value of the firm is positively 
related to the variance of its cash flows. Therefore we expect 3β  to be positive and 
significant. 
After Leland and Pyle’s study using issuer’s ownership as a signal of firm quality, 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989) extend the signaling model by 
                                                 
13 Leland and Pyle show that in the context of the CAPM, the value of the firm will be given by: 
KrbZV +−++−= )]1log())[1/(()( ααα   
where 
r =the riskless interest rate; 
b =the risk aversion parameter in the entrepreneur’s mean-variance utility function; 
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introducing the notion that IPO underpricing is another signal of firm quality. In the 
same year, Grinblatt and Hwang construct a model of bivariate signaling which is 
closest to Leland and Pyle’s model. Leland and Pyle analyze only one signal; only one 
parameter can be unknown, implying that the variance of the cash flows of the firm’s 
projects must be observable.  In Grinblatt and Hwang’s model, the variance as well as 
the mean of the project’s cash flows is unknown, so that a second signal, the level of 
underpricing, is needed to convey the firm’s value to the market.14 In the model’s 
separating equilibrium, a firm’s intrinsic value is positively related to the degree its 
new issue is underpriced. There are eight empirical implications of Grinblatt and 
Hwang’s model, the following three are unique (Among the remained five 
implications, four are consistent with Leland and Pyle’s model and one is consistent 
with Rock’s model):  
H7: The degree of underpricing is positively related to the issuer’s fractional 
ownership given the variance of the firm’s cash flow 
H8: Firm value is positively related to the degree of underpricing given the issuer’s 
fractional ownership 
H9: Firm value and the degree of underpricing are positively related given the 
variance of the firm’s cash flows 
H7 can be tested with the following simple OLS regression: 
  εβββ +++= SDOWNSHPIR 210     (7) 
H8 and H9 can be examined as follows 
  εββββ ++++= SDOWNSHPVIR 3210    (8) 
                                                 








where V is a proxy for firm’s intrinsic value-the 400 trading days aftermarket 
abnormal return (this is more than one and half years of aftermarket return; 400 days 
are chosen because of the data availability). We expect 1β  to be positive if H8 and H9 
hold. However there might be an error in variable problem in equation (8). In 
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989)’s model, if the expected value and the variance of future 
cash flow for a risk-averse firms is unknown to investors, then there exists an 
equilibrium signaling schedule relating two signals, fractional holding and IPO 
underpricing corresponding to the probability of the firm’s intrinsic value to be 
revealed. So IR and OWNSHP are determined endogenously. Moreover, since both IR 
and V include the first day trading price, they might be spuriously negatively 
correlated. To check these possible spurious correlation and simultaneous bias 
problems, I use Housman test to examine the exogeneity of the two variables, V and 
OWNSHP. Exogenous variables AGE, Y2ROA, NK, year dummies, industry 
dummies and the stock exchange dummies are used as instrumental variables. 
Different proxies have been used for IPO firm’s intrinsic value in previous studies 
such as initial market valuation15 of the firm’s quality (Firth and Liau-Tan 1997; 
McGuiness 1992) and two year aftermarket excess returns on equity (Michaely and 
Shaw 1994). I choose Michaely and Shaw’s method because, firstly, initial market 
valuation does not necessarily reflect firm’s true value, it sometimes can be a result of 
over reaction or fads. Su and Fleisher (1999) use the market capitalization in 1996 as a 
proxy of firm’s intrinsic value for his entire sample IPOs from 1987 to 1995. I do not 
regard this as a suitable measure since different IPOs have different aftermarket 
                                                 
15 Initial market valuation of the firm is estimated using the price at the end of the first day of trading in 









information revelation time and there is likely to be a bias for firms that issue IPOs 
later.  
Group 2 – Linkages between IPOs and Seasoned Equity Offerings 
 
The central result of the theoretical models of Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt 
and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) is that high quality firms underprice IPOs with 
the expectation that the loss can be recouped through subsequent equity offerings after 
investors have had the opportunity to recognize the firm’s true potential. Low quality 
firms cannot mimic high-quality firms as they are denied the opportunity to sell 
seasoned issues at attractive prices and capture the potential benefits of IPO 
underpricing. In other words, good firms underprice to “leave a good taste in 
investors’ mouths” and they will be rewarded at the time of the seasoned issue by a 
higher price for the shares. Therefore, the signaling model leads to the empirical 
predictions:  
H10: Firms with more underpriced IPOs are more likely to issue seasoned equity than 
firms with less underpriced IPOs 
A direct implication of the signaling model is that, in their eagerness to capitalize on 
the favorable news, high-quality firms will return to the capital market as soon as the 
opportunity comes, and to maximize the benefit. Namely high-quality firms are more 
likely to reissue. Another reason is that the costs of raising fund are higher for firms 
underprice more, so they are more likely to come to the seasoned equity market to 
recoup their lost. This also implies that: 
H11: Firms with more underpriced IPOs are likely to issue seasoned equity more 








Another intuition behind is that it is more costly for high quality firms to defer their 
investments in new projects than for firms of low quality (Jegadeesh et al, 1993).  
The signaling model implies empirically a positive association between underpricing 
and the success of the SEO. The success of SEO can be measured in terms of the SEO 
size relative to its IPO size and the market reaction to the seasoned issue.  This leads 
to our H12 and H13. 
H12: Firms with more underpriced IPOs are likely to issue larger amount of seasoned 
equity than firms with less underpriced IPOs 
H13: Firms with more underpriced IPOs are likely to experience a less unfavorable 
price reaction to SEO announcement than firms with less underpriced IPOs 
H13 follows the notion that firms with higher IPO underpricing are more likely to 
return with seasoned equity issue and hence investors are more prepared for or less 
surprised by their SEOs. In other words, SEOs from firms with more underpriced 
IPOs are better received by investors because of their superior quality. 
There is, however, an alternative explanation for the existence of the above relations 
between IPO underpricing and SEO activity. In fact market feedback hypotheses 
posits that the market is better informed than the issuer and hence a high return on the 
IPO date or a very good aftermarket performance of stocks implies that the issuer has 
underestimated the marginal return to the project. The issuer uses this information and 
increases the scale of the project by raising additional capital through seasoned 
offerings. To explore whether the relations between IPO underpricing and SEO 
activity can be explained by market feedback hypotheses, I examine whether the 








400 trading day post-IPO window to measure the aftermarket returns because the 
cross-sectional standard deviation of the aftermarket returns in the 400 day window is 
about the same as the cross-sectional standard deviation of the IPO date returns, which 
suggests that the same amount of information is revealed to the market during these 
two periods. This follows the logic in Jegadeesh (1993). Whereas Su and Fleisher 
(1999) use only the 10-day after-market returns to test the market feedback hypothesis. 
There is comparatively too little of information revealed in such a short time than that 
revealed on the initial trading date. Therefore it is not appropriate to compare the 
effect of the two variables on SEO activities even after adjusting for standard 
deviation. 













Where Pseo is the probability that a firm issues seasoned equity after the initial offering. 
The first two independent variables are market adjusted initial return (underpricing) 
and the aftermarket abnormal eturn over the period from trading day 1 to trading day 
400 after the IPO date. The after-market abnormal return equals to market-adjusted 
return over the same period. Since firms with a small IPO size are more likely to come 
to seasoned equity offering, I include the natural logarithm of the IPO size as an 
additional explanatory variable. Finally, I also control for potential differences in SEO 
activity across years, industries and exchanges. We expect a positive β1 if H10 is true 








To examine the relationship between the time elapsed between IPO and SEO, 
TIMESEO, and IPO underpricing, I use a tobit model with right censoring. For firms 
with no SEOs over the years from 1996 through 2001, I assume that the time it takes 
for their re-issuance is infinity. For firms that issue their first SEOs during that period, 
the maximum time elapsed between IPO and SEO in our sample is 1394 days. 
Therefore, I take ln(1400) as the right censoring value. The explanatory variables are 
the same as those in the previous logit model. Su and Fleisher also use a Tobit model 
to test the same hypothesis. But for IPOs with no seasoned equity offerings, they take 




















We expect a negative β1 if H11 is true and a negative β2 if market feedback hypothesis 
is true. 
To test H12 we use a Tobit model similar to Jegadeesh et al. (1993). The Tobit model 
specifies the relation between the relative size of seasoned offering and the 


















            
where SEOSZ/IPOSZ is the relative size of Seasoned Equity Offerings. The 
independent variables are the same as those in the logit model. Similarly, we expect a 








To examine the excess return around the date when the firm announces its SEO, I 
estimate the excess return over the event days -1 through +4, whereday 0 is the SEO 
announcement date. The excess return, REACT, equals to [(P4-P-1)/P-1]-[(I4-I-1)/I-1], 
where P4 is the 4th day closing price of the stock and I4 is the 4th day closing price of 
the corresponding exchange A-share composite index after the SEO announcement 
(the SEO announcement date is taken as the publishing date of the SEO prospectus). 
P−1 and I−1 are the stock price and index price 1 day before the SEO announcement. 
Moreover I include a variable TIMESEO, which measures the number of days between 
the IPO date and the SEO date. The longer the time between these events, the greater 
the volume of public information released about the firm, thus reducing the 
uncertainty about the firm value. Additional independent variables are SEOSZ/MKT, 
which is the SEO size over the stock market value 1 day before the SEO 
announcement and SEOPRC/TRDPRC, which is the SEO price over the closing price 
1 day before the SEO announcement. These variables are included to control for 
possible differences in the extent to which the market is surprised by the SEO 
announcements that are not related to the initial returns of their IPOs or their after-

















Similarly, we expect a positive β1 if H13 is true and a positive β2 if the market 









Chapter 4 Data and Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Data and underpricing 
 
To pursue the objectives of this study, I examine all online fixed price (Shang Wang 
Ding Jia) and firm commitment A-Share IPOs over the period November 1995 - 
December 1998. Financial institutions and close-end funds are excluded because 
previous work, reviewed in Smith (1986) indicates that regulation of these entities 
affects securities issuance phenomena. Online fixed price offering is the most 
commonly used offering method in Chinese A-share IPOs. The study of the online 
fixed price IPOs can represent the general IPO market in China. I exclude the IPOs 
after 1999 to obtain sufficient after-market data for testing the signaling model. To do 
this, I need at least 3 years’ time for the listed firms to issue their first seasoned equity 
offerings. The sample period ends in 1998, which also helps control for government 
intervention in the pricing of IPOs since after 1998 there was a policy change in the 
ceiling for the PE ratio (Before January 1999, a ceiling of 15 was imposed; after that, 
the restriction was loosened and the PE ratio used in IPO pricing rises dramatically. 
Tian (2003) finds that after the deregulation, initial returns decrease by 133.5 percent 
in China.) The data comes from several sources including the trading database from 
GTA (Guo Tai An Information Technology Co.), IPO database from Haitong 
Securities and the panorama network website, www.p5w.net. Finally a sample of 343 
IPOs is collected, representing a broad spectrum of industries such as utilities, 
properties, conglomerates, industry and commerce. Descriptive statistics are reported 








proceeds), are RMB 304 million and RMB 220 million respectively. The average 
proportion of shares retained by the state, legal entities and employees in sample IPOs 
is 71.04%, indicating that the majority of shareholding of equities are non-negotiable 
government shares and legal entities shares. The average age of IPO firms is 3 years 
old. The mean of PE ratio and offering price are 14.85 and 6.19 respectively. 
 
Table 4.1Descriptive statistics on 343 IPOs in the 1996-1998 period and 215 SEOs in the period 
1996-2001  
Variable  No. 
Obs. 




Panel A  IPO characteristics       
IPOSZ (million RMB) 343 304.00 220.50 2625.00 33.00 310.00 3.60
OWNSHP  343 0.7104 0.7353 0.8649 0.3670 0.0721 -1.2751
AGE ( years) 343 3.06 2.03 40.99 0.10 3.27 6.08
PE 343 14.85 14.57 32.52 8.80 2.51 0.76
LAG ( days) 343 32.43 21.00 377.00 9.00 35.09 6.02
NK (million RMB) 343 751.44 466.27 7363.60 103.97 950.01 3.97
P0 343 6.19 5.99 15.70 2.45 1.83 1.38
P1 343 13.71 12.74 53.57 4.41 6.01 1.90
BFMARRTN 343 0.1583 0.1076 0.8649 -0.2859 0.2407 0.6655
AFTRTN 343 0.1482 -0.0210 3.9045 -3.0145 0.7575 1.3241
        
Panel B  SEO characteristics       
SEOSZ (million RMB) 215 248.27 188.10 1395.00 2.08 206.07 2.49
SEOPRC 215 8.79 8.00 26.00 3.30 3.50 1.60
TIMESEO (days) 215 805 805 1394 441 219.44 0.55
REACT 215 -0.0109 -0.0144 0.2672 -0.1308 0.0472 1.2076
 
215 out of the 343 IPOs issue their first SEOs in the period 1996 to 2001. In other 
words, over 60% of the sample IPOs issues SEOs. All the 215 SEOs included in our 
study are rights offers (SEOs to the existing shareholders). Public seasoned offering 
(SEOs to the general public investors) are rarely seen in China because public 
seasoned offerings are not permitted until 1997. Even after the restriction was lifted, 








SEO data are reported in panel B of table 4.1. The average SEO price is RMB 8.79 
and the average SEO size is RMB 248.27 million. The mean and minimum time it 
takes from IPO to SEO is 805 days and 441 days, respectively. 
 Table 4.2 presents the distribution of new and seasoned equity offerings through time. 
Fixed priced new issues from 1996 to 1998 distributed quite evenly and each year 
accounts for around 30% of all sample IPOs. Most SEOs occur during the time from 
1998 to 2000. 85% of the SEOs in my sample are from the year 1998 to 2000.  
Table 4.2 Distribution of 343 fixed pricing IPOs and 215 first seasoned equity  offerings (SEOs) by 
offering year, 1996-2001 
 Initial Public Offering Seasoned Offerings 
Year Number Percentage (%) Number Percentage (%)
1996 121 35.28 0 0.00
1997 125 36.44 19 8.84
1998 97 28.28 66 30.70
1999  52 24.19
2000  65 30.23
2001  13 6.05
Total 343 100.00 215 100.00
 
To measure the level of IPO underpricing, I use the market adjusted initial return i.e. 
the raw initial return after taking into account of the overall market effect.  
The raw initial return (RAWIR) is calculated as: 
001 /)( PPPRAWIR −=  
P0 is the offer price and P1 is the first day closing price.  
Market adjusted initial return equals to RAWIR minus A-share composite index return 
from the IPO date to its first trading date. 








where I1 is the closing price of the SHSE A-share composite index or SZSE A-share 
composite index on the first trading day of the new issue, and I0 is the closing price of 
the SHSE A-share composite index or SZSE A-share composite index on the IPO date.  
To examine a longer-term IPO after-market performance, I calculate initial returns 
over 10 and 100 trading days after the IPO as 
    00100010 /)(/)(10 IIIPPPIR −−−=  
and    0010000100 /)(/)(100 IIIPPPIR −−−=  
Table 4.3 Initial returns in IPOs, with adjustment for allocation 
  Variabl
e 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness 
Initial return 
(underpricing) 
      
1 IR 1.2359 1.1123 8.2050 -0.1211 0.8479 2.4129
  (27.00)  
2 IR10 1.1927 1.0619 5.6548 -0.1886 0.8372 1.5264
  (26.38)  
3 IR100 1.2379 1.0192 5.4331 -0.8410 0.9145 1.1342
  (25.07)  
Allocation-weighted initial return  
4 AWIR -0.0033 -0.0050 0.3652 -0.3621 0.0955 -0.1360
    (-0.63)       
The number in parenthesis is the t-statistics test that the mean is different from zero. 
 
Some summary statistics for the initial excess returns are presented in table 4.3 and the 
distribution of IR is depicted in figure 1. The average IR is positive and significant: the 
mean is 123.59% with t = 27.00. Only 7 out of 343 IPOs have negative initial returns. 
Nearly 98% of the IPOs have positive initial returns. The average 10-day and 100-day 
initial excess returns, IR10 and IR100, are 119.27% and 123.79%, respectively. This is 
much lower than the Chinese IPO underpricing level in early 1990s reported in 
previous studies, showing that the Chinese new issue market has indeed improved its 








Notably, the mean initial return from day +1 to day +100 is not significantly different 
from zero (mean = −1.72%, t = −0.93). If the price of a new issue at the opening of 
trade represents an overreaction or speculative bubble rather than the true economic or 
fundamental price, we should witness a significant decline in the stock return in the 
after-market. However, we do not see a statistical difference between IR and IR100, 
which suggests that there is no momentum effect in pricing. The correlation between 
IR and the subsequent initial returns from day +1 to day +100 is 0.114, indicating that 
the price of the IPO stocks adjusts efficiently after the IPO. All 3 initial return 
distributions are positively skewed, reflecting the very high returns obtained in a few 
cases (see figure 4.1).  
 






































































































Table 4.4 presents the summary statistics of the initial returns and the PE ratios used 
in IPO pricing by year and by stock exchange. There are only 2 observations in 1995 
and I include these into the data for 1996. The average initial returns in 1996, 1997 
and 1998 are 95.87%, 144.96% and 130.57%, respectively. The significant difference 
in underpricing across years is mainly caused by the changes in the IPO pricing policy 
over time. As discussed before, the offer price in the Chinese fixed price offering is 
determined by the multiplication of PE ratio of the same industry and the issuing 
firm’s after-tax profit per share. The supervisory authorities often impose a ceiling to 
the PE ratio used and the ceiling level changes over time. Table 4.4 shows that the PE 
ratios used in 1996 are significantly higher than that in 1997 and 1998. I will not 
analyze in detail why the initial return in 1996 is lower than that of 1997 and 1998 or 
why the IPOs in 1997 are more underpriced than IPOs in 1998 since the policy 
changes are complicated. There is not much difference in the initial returns and PE 
ratios across the two stock exchanges. 
 
Table 4.4 Statistics of initial returns and PE ratios by years and by stock exchanges 
  Years Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness
1996 (121)      
 IR 0.96 0.95 3.37 -0.12 0.90
 PE 15.34 14.90 32.52 9.70 0.26
1997 (125)      
 IR 1.45 1.29 4.64 0.01 1.46
 PE 14.67 14.90 18.00 10.00 -0.16
1998 (97)       
 IR 1.31 1.13 8.20 -0.05 3.25
 PE 14.48 14.50 18.00 8.80 0.20
Shanghai (170)      
 IR 1.20 1.11 4.31 -0.12 1.05
 PE 14.86 14.57 32.52 8.80 3.13
Shenzhen (173)      
 IR  1.27 1.13 8.20 -0.11 2.86
 PE 14.84 14.57 27.96 11.35 -0.59








4.2 Allocation and Adverse selection 
 
 
The pro rata allocation rate in China is the ballot ratio used in the lottery and equals to 
the ratio of the number of shares publicly offered in the IPO to the number of shares 
subscribed by investors. There is no under-subscription in the sample. BALLOT 
denotes the ballot ratio (allocation rate). Some summary statistics of BALLOT are 
presented in table 4.5, and the pattern of its distribution is depicted in figure 4.2.   
 
Table 4.5 Statistics of allocations in sample IPOs 
   Mean Median Maximum Minimum Obs.
BALLOT   0.0218 0.0065 0.9540 0.0013 343
    
Ballot classified by initial return  
    
For IR<0; Ballot  0.3432 0.0851 0.954 0.0057 7
For IR>0; Ballot  0.0151 0.0065 0.7315 0.0013 336
 
The ballot ratio in most IPOs is extremely small due to the overwhelming 
oversubscription. The overwhelming oversubscription is mainly caused by surplus 
demand for the limited supply of negotiable shares. Moreover, the vast majority of the 
primary market investors are relatively unsophisticated private individual investors. 
The characteristics of Chinese individual investors and the weakness in information 
disclosure result in a very big proportion of uninformed investors in the Chinese 
market. The distribution shows that the allocation rate in most IPOs (95%) is below 
5% and there are only a few cases with ballot ratio greater than that. The mean for 
BALLOT in our sample is 2.18% and the median is much lower, 0.65%. The average 
allocation rate for overpriced IPOs is 34%, which is much higher than that of the 
underpriced IPOs (1.51%). This is consistent with the winner’s curse theory that the 








However, this is weak evidence of the presence of winner’s curse problem since we 
have only 7 overpriced IPOs. 
 





















































































If H1 is true, the allocation-weighted initial returns minus the riskless rate should be 
approximately zero. The statistics for AWIR are presented in table 4.2. The mean of 
AWIR is negative (−0.33%), and is not statistically different from zero (t = −0.63). 
This suggests that, despite the seemingly high initial returns, uninformed IPO 
















The estimated coefficient for BALLOTT is −0.41, with t = −7.94. The strong inverse 
relationship between initial returns and allocations to investors is again consistent with 
Rock’s hypothesis of adverse selection. 
The above two empirical results confirm the major empirical implications of Rock’s 
theory. I conclude that individual investors in China face the winner’s curse problem. 
However, without data on application sizes and other details, it is not clear who the 
informed investors in the Chinese IPO market are. 
 
4.3 Ex ante uncertainty  
 
Model 1 of table 4.6 presents the regression results for equation (4). Consistent with 
H3, the coefficient for the standard deviation of the after-market returns is positive and 
strongly significant. The coefficients for lnAGE and lnIPOSZ are both negative and 
significant, which supports the ex ante uncertainty hypotheses H4 and H5, namely, the 
age and offer size of the issuing firm are inversely related to IPO underpricing in the 
Chinese IPO market.  
The coefficient of BFMARTN is positive and significant at the 5% level, which means 
that the IPOs are more underpriced in hot market. This is consistent with previous 
studies (Davis and Yeomans, 1976 (UK), Reilly, 1977 (USA), and McGuiness, 1992 
(Hong Kong)). The coefficient of OWNSHP is negative and significant, consistent 
                                                 
16To control for other relevant independent variables, another regression has been done (see appendix 
C). As shown in the table,  the conclusion is of no big difference from equation (2). Therefore only 








with Mok and Hui (1998). This shows that Chinese investors interpret high state and 
legal entity retention as government support and business guaranty. That is, high 
equity retention lowers the ex ante uncertainty about firm value, thereby lowers the 
required level of underpricing. The time lag between the IPO date and the first trading 
date is insignificant in explaining IPO underpricing in the regression. Different from 
Mok and Hui (1998) and Su and Fleisher (1999)’s sample, the time lag after 1996 has 
been dramatically shortened, which removes previous uncertain factors caused by the 
extreme long time lag.17  
 
Table 4.6 OLS regression Analysis Investigating Ex Ante Uncertainty and other Significant 
Explanatory Variables of IPO Underpricing  
 
Dependent Variable: IR Model 1 Model 2 
Explanatory Variables:  Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat.  
























 LAG 0.0003 0.9 0.0002 0.74  




 Y97 -0.0091 -0.39 -0.0109 -0.48  
 IN2 -0.0031 -0.09   
 IN3 0.0029 0.03   
 IN4 0.0109 0.47   
 IN6 -0.0546 -1.71   




Adjusted R²   0.9671 0.9671  
** Significant t statistics at the 5 percent level 
*** Significant t statistics at the 1 percent level 
                                                 
17 The average lag time in our sample is only 32 days, which is much shorter than the average of 260 
days reported in Su and Fleisher’s (1999) study. The much shorter lag time from the IPO date to the 
first listing date in our sample shows that the online fixed pricing offering method is more efficient than 









The positive and significant coefficient for the dummy variable Y96 shows that the 
IPOs made in 1996 are less underpriced than the IPOs in 1998. This might be affected 
by the changes of the PE ratio used in IPO pricing. There is no statistical difference in 
underpricing across industries. The IPO underpricing in SHSE is significantly higher 
than that in SZSE. As we have seen in table 4.4, there is not much difference in the PE 
ratio used in IPO pricing across the two exchanges. Thus, this cannot be caused by the 
difference in the PEs. One explanation is that many firms at SZSE are joint ventures, 
while those listed at SHSE are mostly SOEs. There are relatively more disclosure and 
less uncertainty in joint venture firms. That is why IPOs listed on SZSE are less 
underpriced. The model explains 96.7% of the variability in initial returns of the 
sample of A-share IPOs, which shows the strong explanatory power of ex ante 
uncertainty. This supports my hypothesis that the high ex ante uncertainty in IPO 
value is the main reason for the high level of IPO underpricing observed in the 
Chinese market. Model 2 in table 4.6 presents a regression excluding 4 insignificant 
industry dummy variables. The conclusion is the same as those from model 1. 
 
4.4 The signaling model  
 
Group 1- Correlations among IPO underpricing and issuer’s 
intrinsic value, fractional ownership and project variance 
 
Table 4.7 presents my regression result for equation (6). Control for risks and IPOSZ, 
the slope coefficient estimate (t-statistics) of αˆ  is 79.85 (1.06). Not only it is not 








This indicates that the ownership signaling model does not stand in the Chinese A-
share market. As expected, the coefficient for SD is positive and significant.  
Table 4.7 OLS regression to test Leland and Pyle’s theoretical signaling model 
Dependent Variable: V1    
Explanatory Variables:  Coeff. t stat.  
 Constant -103.81 -2.12 **
 IPOSZ 1.75 41.91 ***
 AHAT 79.85 1.06 
 SD 1828.72 11.65 ***
Adjusted R²   0.8389    
** Significant t statistics at the 5 percent level 
*** Significant t statistics at the 1 percent level 
 
If H7 is true, we expect a positive sign on OWNSHP. But our OLS regression result in 
table 4.8 reports, on the contrary, a significant (at 5% level) and negative coefficient 
for OWNSHP, our proxy for issuer’s fractional ownership at IPOs. This indicates that 
Grinblatt and Hwang’s bivariate signaling model does not stand in the Chinese A-
share market either. 
Table 4.8 First OLS regression to test Grinblatt and Hwang’s Bivariate Signaling Model 
Dependent Variable: IR    
Explanatory Variables:  Coeff. t stat.  
 C 0.11 1.15 
 OWNSHP -0.31 -2.34 **
 SD 10.18 87.56 ***
Adjusted R²   0.9573    
** Significant t statistics at the 5 percent level 
*** Significant t statistics at the 1 percent level 
 
 
Model 1 in Table 4.9 gives the OLS regression results for equation (8). We can see 
that V is very insignificant in explaining IR. This again proves that Grinblatt and 
Hwang’s signaling model does not stand in the Chinese market during the sample 
period. Table 4.10 presents the first regression of Hausman test for the exogeneity of 
variable V. We take the residual of the regression in table 4.10 as VRESID and add it 








result.  The insignificant coefficient for VRESID indicates that V is exogenous in 
equation (8). Using the same Hausman test, I find that OWNSHP is exogenous too 
(results not reported here). So the spurious correlation and simultaneous bias problem 
has been eliminated. 
Table 4.9 Second OLS regression to test Grinblatte and Hwang’s Bivariate Signaling Model 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Dependent Variable: IR       
Explanatory Variables: Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat. 
 C 0.11 1.13  0.11 1.11 
 V 0.01 0.37  -0.04 -0.78 
 OWNSHP -0.31 -2.33 ** -0.30 -2.26 **
 SD 10.18 87.12 *** 10.20 86.21 ***
 VRESID 0.05 0.90 
Adjusted R² 0.9572   0.9577    
** Significant t statistics at the 5 percent level 
*** Significant t statistics at the 1 percent level 
 
 
Table 4.10 First regression of Housman test for the exogeneity of variable V 
Dependent Variable: V     
Explanatory Variables:  Coeff. t stat.  
  Constant 0.17 1.45  
  LNAGE -0.01 -0.13  
  Y2ROA 0.00 0.73  
  NK -0.16 -3.34 *** 
  STKCDSH 0.12 1.51  
  IN0002 0.18 1.09  
  IN0003 -0.62 -1.39  
  IN0004 0.06 0.49  
  IN0006 0.17 1.11  
  Y96 0.00 0.02  
  Y97 -0.10 -0.98  
Adjusted R²  0.0350   
** Significant t statistics at the 5 percent level 
*** Significant t statistics at the 1 percent level 










Table 4.11 presents the logit regression test for the relation between IPO underpricing 
and the probability of seasoned equity issue (equation (9)). The slope coefficient (t-
statistics) on the variable IR is −0.07 (−0.40). The slope coefficient for AFTRTN (t-
statistics) is 0.86 (3.97). For H10, the signaling hypothesis expects a positive and 
significant role of IPO initial return in explaining the likelihood of issuing subsequent 
equity offerings. However, I find a negative and insignificant coefficient for the initial 
returns. This suggests that the signaling model does not stand. At the same time, the 
estimates show a strong relation between the after-market price appreciation and the 
likelihood of SEOs. In other words, the coefficient for AFTRTN suggests that the 
higher the after-market returns, the more likely the listed firm re-issue. This is 
consistent with the market feedback hypothesis. Other two significant variables are 
Y96 and Y97, which means that IPOs in 1996 and 1997 are more likely to issue SEOs 
than those in 1998. This is probably because IPOs in 1996 and 1997 have longer time 
for SEOs than those in 1998. The rest of the dummy variables are insignificant and 
their coefficients are jointly not different from zero. Therefore, I report a second logit 
regression excluding those insignificant dummy variables in Model 2 of table 4.11. 
Model 2 reflect almost the same result as that of model 1 except that the significance 










Table 4.11 Logit Model to Test the relation between underpricing and the likelihood of SEO 
Dependent Variable: SEOD Model 1 Model 2 
Explanatory Variables:  Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat. 
 Constant 4.05 0.88 3.02 0.67 
 IR -0.07 -0.40 -0.07 -0.40 
 AFTRTN 0.86 3.97 *** 0.81 3.89 ***
 LOG(IPOSZ) -0.23 -1.00 -0.17 -0.77 
 Y96 1.02 2.61 *** 0.98 2.53 **
 Y97 1.46 4.78 *** 1.39 4.69 ***
 IN2 -0.12 -0.25   
 IN3 1.52 1.20   
 IN4 0.16 0.45   
 IN6 -0.90 -1.95   
  STKCDSH 0.16 0.67       
Note: 
 1.  215 observations with Dep=1, total observations is 343. 
 2. ** Significant t statistics at the 5 percent level 




The right censoring Tobit regression examining H11 is presented in table 4.12. The 
slope coefficient estimate for IR is 0.04, with t = 0.83. The sign of IR is opposite to 
our expectation and the t-statistics is insignificant. This again shows that the signaling 
model does not stand in the Chinese market. The coefficient for AFTRTN is negative 
(−0.17) and statistically different from zero at the 1% level (t = −4.42). This result 
indicates that firms that experience large price appreciation after the IPOs are likely to 
raise larger amounts of capital through seasoned equity issues. This is again consistent 











Table 4.12 Tobit Regression to Examine the relationship between Time SEO and IPO 
Unperpricing 
Dependent Variable: LNTIMESEO    
Explanatory Variables:  Coeff. t stat.
 Constant 7.44 6.98 ***
 IR 0.04 0.83
 AFTRTN -0.17 -4.42 ***
 LOG(IPOSZ) -0.01 -0.21
 Y96 -0.38 -4.18 ***
 Y97 -0.35 -4.85 ***
 IN2 0.09 0.83
 IN3 -0.40 -1.34
 IN4 -0.05 -0.62
 IN6 0.28 2.49 **
 STKCDSH 0.00 0.07
Adjusted R²   0.1248   
Note: 
1. Total observations are 343 and right-censored observations are 128. 
2. ** Significant t statistics at the 5 percent level 
   *** Significant t statistics at the 1 percent level 
 
Model 1 of table 4.13 reports the Tobit regression estimates examining the relation 
between the size of the seasoned offerings and the explanatory variables (equation 
(11)). The estimate (t-statistic) of the slope coefficient for the variable IR is 0.02 
(0.15), which indicates that the excess initial returns in the IPOs are weak in 
explaining the relative SEO size and H12 is rejected. Same as the previous logit 
regression, I find a positive (0.46) and significant (t = 4.84) coefficient for AFTRTN. 
Consistent with my previous findings, the market feedback hypothesis is verified for 
the Chinese A-share market. The tobit regression also shows that IPOSZ is negative 
(−0.37) and significant (t = −2.85) in explaining the relative SEO size. The 
coefficients (t-statistics) for year dummy variables Y96 and Y97 are 0.6 (2.67) and 
0.72 (3.97), respectively, indicating that the IPOs in 1996 and 1997 raise higher 
amount of capital through seasoned equity issues than the IPOs in the year 1998. 








smaller amount of capital in SEOs than industrial firms. There is no statistical 
difference in the two stock exchanges. Therefore I report a second Tobit regression 
excluding STKCDSH in model 2 of table 4.13, which shows almost the same results as 
those of model 1. 
 
Table 4.13 Tobit Regression to Examine the relationship between SEO Size and IPO 
Unperpricing 
Dependent Variable: SEOSZ/IPOSZ Model 1 Model 2 
Explanatory Variables:  Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat. 
 Constant 7.05 2.68 *** 7.08 2.69 ***
 IR 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 
 AFTRTN 0.46 4.84 *** 0.46 4.82 ***
 LOG(IPOSZ) -0.37 -2.85 *** -0.38 -2.87 ***
 Y96 0.60 2.67 *** 0.60 2.67 ***
 Y97 0.72 3.97 *** 0.72 4.01 ***
 IN2 0.25 0.88 0.23 0.83 
 IN3 1.04 1.41 1.06 1.43 
 IN4 -0.05 -0.25 -0.06 -0.32 
 IN6 -0.54 -2.00 ** -0.54 -1.99 **
 STKCDSH -0.07 -0.49   
Adjusted R²   0.1440   0.1434  
Note: 
1.Total observations are 343 and left censored observations are 128. 
2. ** Significant t statistics at the 5 percent level 
    *** Significant t statistics at the 1 percent level 
 
To examine the relation among the stock-price response to the announcement of 
seasoned equity offerings, underpricing and after-market returns, I first use a sub-
sample of 215 IPOs with subsequent offerings to run the OLS regression. The results 
are presented in model 1 of table 4.14. The estimated coefficient for IR is positive, as 
expected, but statistically insignificant (t = 1.69)18. This indicates that underpricing the 
IPO does not significantly mitigate the negative share-price response to a first 
seasoned equity offering. The estimate of the coefficient for the variable AFTRTN is 
                                                 
18 Another regression excluding insignificant dummies from model 1 has been done; the result is of no 








also not significantly different from zero. The rest of the explanatory variables are 
insignificant. The adjusted R2 is 0.0089, which shows that the regression has very 
weak explanatory power. This is not surprising in the Chinese market because the 
seasoned equity offering news is normally leaked out long time before the publication 
of the SEO announcement. Usually months before a re-issuance, a board meeting is 
held to discuss the re-issuance decision and the meeting resolution is published the 
next day after the meeting. Therefore, by the time of SEO prospectus publication, the 
SEO news is not new and the stock price has already adjusted. 
Model 1 of table 4.14 examines only 215 firms with their first SEOs within 3 years of 
IPO. This is only a subset of our larger population. The decision to make subsequent 
offerings is endogenous, which is not reflected in the cross-sectional estimates of 
model 1.  Therefore the estimator may be inconsistent as a result of truncation bias. 
Eckbo et al. (1990) derive consistent estimators using a latent variable model. These 
estimators account for the presence of the potential truncation bias. Michaley and 
Shaw (1994) use this method to detect the dividend announcement effect. We also 
adopt the same model to further examine H13.  
Firstly, a probit regression is estimated as followings: 
εγ += ZSEOD  
where Z denotes the independent variables, which are IR, AFTRTN, Ln(IPOSZ), Y96 
and Y97. They are related to the likelihood that a SEO will be issued. Then we 
calculate the Mill’s ratio MILLSRATIO as φ(Zγ)/Ф(Zγ), where φ is the normal density 
function and Ф is the normal cumulative distribution function.  
By adding MILLSRATIO as one more explanatory variable into equation (12), 
























The estimation result of equation (13) is presented in model 2 of table 4.14. Same as 
our regression in model 1, the slope coefficient for IR and AFTRTN are still 
insignificant. This verifies the fact that more underpriced IPOs do not experience a 
less unfavorable price reaction to SEO announcement than firms with less underpriced 
IPOs. Thus H13 is rejected. 
In summary, the relations between IPOs and SEOs activities in the Chinese market are 
mainly caused by the after-market performances of stocks instead of the issuer’s 
signaling behavior. The signaling hypothesis does not stand in the Chinese A-share 
market, while the market feedback hypothesis is supported.  
 
Table 4.14 OLS Regression to Test the Price Reaction at the Announcement of SEO 
Dependent Variable: REACT Model 1 Model 2 
Explanatory Variables:  Coeff. t stat. Coeff. t stat.  
 Constant -0.35 -1.98 ** -0.09 -1.04  
 IR 0.01 1.69 0.00 1.59  
 AFTRTN 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.41  
 LNIPOSZ 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.94  
 Y96 0.02 1.61 0.01 0.82  
 Y97 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.08  
 IN2 -0.01 -0.76 0.00 -0.40  
 IN3 0.04 1.14 0.03 1.12  
 IN4 -0.01 -1.06 -0.01 -0.99  
 IN6 -0.01 -1.03 -0.01 -0.86  
 STKCDSH 0.00 -0.19 0.00 -0.37  
 LNTIMESEO 0.02 0.81 0.00 -0.03  
 LNSEOSZ 0.02 1.54 0.00 0.44  
 SEOSZ/MKT -0.03 -1.25 -0.01 -0.85  
 SEOPRC/TRDPRC -0.04 -1.71 -0.04 -2.29 **
 MILLS RATIO 0.00 0.22  
Adjusted R²   0.0089   0.0177   
Note: 
1. Number of observations for model 1 is 215 and model 2 is 343. 
2. ** Significant t statistics at the 5 percent level 









Chapter 5   Conclusions 
 
 
This study examines the degree of underpricing for 343 online fixed price offerings 
from November 1995 to December 1998. The initial return is on average 123.59%, 
much lower than the level in early 1990s reported in previous studies. This indicates 
that the efficiency in the primary market has improved. However, it is still larger than 
what is found in most emerging markets. 
I investigate possible explanations for the level of underpricing. I analyze possible 
explanations for the Chinese market according to the characteristics of the Chinese 
market and examine all major models, i.e., the winner’s curse model, the ex ante 
uncertainty explanation and the signaling model. 
Consistent with the winner’s curse model, after adjusting for rationing, uninformed 
investors in the Chinese market essentially break even. The negative relation between 
the initial returns and the allocation rates to investors also suggest that Chinese 
individual investors face the winner’s curse problem. Using several proxies for ex ante 
uncertainty, I find ex ante uncertainty has very high explanatory power in explaining 
the Chinese IPO underpricing. This is consistent with Mok and Hui (1998)’s assertion.  
 
After an extensive examination of 8 hypotheses of the signaling model, I conclude that 
the signaling model does not stand in the Chinese market. Evidence shows that the 
relations between IPO underpricing and SEO activities are caused by the market 
feedback information. This is contrary to Su and Fleisher (1999)’s findings. 
In all, the main reasons for the Chinese A-share IPO underpricing are investor’s high 








have eliminated the possibility of the principal-agent and the signaling explanation, I 
conclude that the positive relation between ex ante uncertainty and underpricing is 
evidence in support of the winner’s curse problem. This suggests that reducing issuing 
firms’ ex ante uncertainty, such as through more information disclosure from IPO 
firms, will help to ameliorate the winner’s curse problem and thereby lower the level 
of underpricing. 
Given the prominence of the Chinese stock market in the emerging markets, the 
results in this paper should be able to shed some light on explanations of IPO 
underpricing in other emerging markets. The results add more evidences on testing of 
winner’s curse model, the ex ante uncertainty explanation and the signaling model as 













In China, almost all new issue offerings before 2001 are fixed price offerings (The 
offer price in the fixed price offering is chosen according to the formula of taking the 
after tax profits per share multiplied by a price earning ratio). But the fixed price 
offerings are not the same in their share allocations. There has been an overwhelming 
demand 19  of new issue stocks in the Chinese market due to the few investment 
opportunities and the high saving rate for the public. Therefore, how to distribute a 
fixed amount of shares is a problem from the outset. As the Chinese stock market 
develops, share allocation methods have gone through many stages of reforms.  I will 
discuss five of the most commonly used methods in the past ten years. 
1. Limited lottery forms 
 
In 1991 and 1992, there was a lottery system with a pre-announced fixed number of 
lottery forms. The maximum number of lottery forms each individual investor could 
purchase was also fixed. Winners of the lottery could purchase a designated number of 
shares per form. Thus, investors knew the odds of winning the lottery in advance. But 
the limited lottery forms relative to an overwhelming demand of IPO and widespread 
corruption caused a social chaos in Shenzhen in August 1992. 
                                                 








2. Unlimited lottery forms 
 
In 1993, when Tsingtao Brewery got listed, a method of selling unlimited number of 
lottery forms was first used. Investors in this case could purchase as many lottery 
forms as they desired. This is a fairer method than that of selling limited forms, yet 
many shortcomings still exist such as high cost and low efficiency.  A big amount of 
money is spent on the printing of application forms while the issuer cannot raise more 
funds from it. 
3. Unlimited number of deposit certificates 
 
In August 1993, the authorities announce that issuing firms can use a new offering 
method called unlimited number of deposit certificates. The deposit certificate here is 
a fixed maturity, fixed amount and specially designed deposit certificate. The ballot 
ratio in this case is decided by number of certificates sold, number of shares each 
deposit certificates are entitled to and number of shares publicly offered. Although this 
method saves social cost in printing the unlimited lottery forms, it causes a large 
amount of social deposit savings move around the country. Large amount of cash 
flows into banks where a new issue is offering. When the new issue is over, investors 
must go to the banks to get back their defrozen funds. This is extremely inconvenient. 
4. Full payment and pro rata allocation 
 
In this method, investors were required to deposit a certain quantity of funds into a 
special saving account when submitting an application for shares, which could not be 
withdrawn until the lottery was completed. These special saving accounts were given 








5. Online fixed price offerings (Shang Wang Ding Jia)  
 
In 1994, another share allocation mechanism was introduced in which investors bid 
for quantities, with pro-rata allocation in the event of oversubscribed shares. This 
method is the same as the full payment and pro rata allocation except that all 
transactions happen here use the existing stock exchange trading system. Investors 
again need to pay a deposit but with prompt repayment for unsuccessful applicants. It 
has proved a more efficient procedure and meets with the approval of investors. This 
is also the most commonly used offering method in the past 10 years. 
Table A provides a summary statistics on the allocation methods adopted for A-share 
IPOs from 1990 through 2000 (financial firms and closed end funds are excluded). 
 
Table a: Statistics on the allocation methods adopted in the Chinese A-share market from 1990 
through 2000 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
1 & 2 0 7 49 53 13 2 0 0 0 0 0 124
3 0 0 0 3 6 1 4 2 0 0 0 16
4 0 0 0 1 1 1 49 59 5 0 0 116
5 0 0 0 0 0 6 120 125 97 91 73 512
Other methods 8 1 22 3 3 2 0 0 0 2 64 105
Not disclosed 2 4 9 63 13 0 0 0 0 0 1 92
Total 10 13 80 123 36 12 173 186 102 93 138 965
Note: 1 &2 Limited or unlimited lottery forms; 3 Unlimited number of deposit certificates; 4 Full payment and 
pro rata allocation; 5 Online fixed price offering (Shang Wang Ding Jia) 




 Appendix B Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Table b: Correlation matrix of continuous explanatory variables in equation (4) 
 IR SD LNAGE LNIPOSZ BFMARRTN OWNSHP LAG 
IR 1.00       
SD 0.98 1.00      
LNAGE 0.01 0.07 1.00     
LNIPOSZ -0.28 -0.33 -0.28 1.00    
BFMARRTN 0.11 0.13 0.14 -0.30 1.00   
OWNSHP 0.00 0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.07 1.00  




Table c: Correlation matrix of continuous explanatory variables in equation (6) 
 V1 IPOSZ AHAT SD
V1 1.00    
IPOSZ 0.88 1.00   
AHAT -0.11 -0.14 1.00  





Table d: Correlation matrix of continuous explanatory variables in equation (10) 
 IR AFTRTN LNIPOSZ
IR 1.00
AFTRTN -0.09 1.00










Table e: Correlation matrix of continuous explanatory variables in equation (12) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) IR                  1.00   
(2) AFTRTN -0.14 1.00   
(3) LNIPOSZ -0.22 -0.23 1.00   
(4) LNTIMESEO             0.26 -0.08 -0.06 1.00   
(5) LNSEOSZ               -0.18 0.05 0.51 -0.01 1.00  
(6) SEOSZ/MKT            -0.19 -0.17 -0.03 -0.15 0.48 1.00 
(7) SEOPRC/TRDPRC    -0.04 -0.32 0.37 0.19 0.21 0.13 1.00
 
Appendix C Test of the Winner's Curse Model 
 
Table f: OLS Regression to Test the Winner's Curse Model 
Dependent Variable: IR       
Explanatory Variables: Coeff. t stat. 
 Constant -0.79 -2.89 ***
 BALLOTT -0.06 -5.10 ***
 SD 10.11 82.83 ***
 LNAGE -0.03 -3.36 ***
 LNIPOSZ 0.04 2.85 ***
 BFMARRTN 0.00 -0.06 
 OWNSHP -0.41 -3.36 ***
 LAG 0.00 1.13 
 STKCDSH 0.04 2.00 **
     
Number of observations 343  
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